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Abstract. Hermeneutic fictionalism about mathematics maintains that mathematics is not 
committed to the existence of abstract objects such as numbers. Mathematical sentences 
are true, but they should not be construed literally. Numbers are just fictions in terms of 
which we can conveniently describe things which exist. The paper defends Stephen 
Yablo’s hermeneutic fictionalism against an objection proposed by John Burgess and 
Gideon Rosen. The objection, directed against all forms of nominalism, goes as follows. 
Nominalism can take either a hermeneutic form and claim that mathematics, when rightly 
understood, is not committed to the existence of abstract objects, or a revolutionary form 
and claim that mathematics is to be understood literally but is false. The hermeneutic 
version is said to be untenable because there is no philosophically unbiased linguistic 
argument to show that mathematics should not be understood literally. Against this I argue 
that it is wrong to demand that hermeneutic fictionalism should be established solely on 
the basis of linguistic evidence. In addition, there are reasons to think that hermeneutic 
fictionalism cannot even be defeated by linguistic arguments alone. 
 
Fictionalism is a general term for approaches which analyze a particular discourse or a 
particular idiom in terms of fictions. Take, for example, the sentence ‘The average star has 2.4 
planets’. Given the logical form of sentences involving definite descriptions, this sentence 
seems to assert that there is one and only one object which is the average star. But there is no 
such object, so the sentence is false. How come, then, that we find it true? The fictionalist 
says that in using this sentence we engage in a sort of game. We pretend that there is such an 
object and use this pretense to express a truth, namely, that if divide the number of planets 
with the number of stars we get 2.4. 
Fictionalism can be pursued in a hermeneutic and in a revolutionary spirit.
2
 Hermeneutic 
fictionalism seeks to uncover how the given discourse or idiom is in fact understood, i.e. to 
bring to the fore the meaning which has been there all along. The example just used is an 
instance of hermeneutic fictionalism. It does not tell us that we should stop believing in the 
existence of an average star, for we have never believed that. It tells us that instead of looking 
for a novel construal of the logical form of the sentence which would make it literally true, we 
should accept that it has the logical form it seems to have and it is not literally true.
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Revolutionary fictionalism, in contrast, claims to reveal that what we took to be real is in fact 
a piece of fiction. It opens our eyes to the fact that we were wrong, and calls on us to change 
our commitments. Such is Field’s attempt to counter Quine’s and Putnam’s indispensability 
argument, according to which we cannot but accept that the abstract objects of mathematics 
exist, because physics cannot do without them.
4
 He attempts to show that physics can be 
pursued without numbers, so we do not have to put up with their existence.
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Stephen Yablo advocates hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to mathematics, and his 
theory has many attractions. It is nominalistic, so it can avoid the epistemological problem 
raised by Benacerraf. (A note of clarification: by ‘nominalism’ I mean the rejection of abstract 
objects and not the rejection of universals; nominalism so conceived is compatible with in re 
realism about universals.) In addition, it promises to explain why mathematics is necessary, 
how we can know it a priori, why we feel that mathematics is absolute in the sense that there 
cannot be an alternative arithmetic or set theory, why mathematics can be applied to the 
physical world, and many other things, including certain features of mathematical language. I 
will not elaborate on these, I will simply assume that it can deliver what it promises. In this 
paper I attempt to defend hermeneutic fictionalism against an objection first formulated by 
John Burgess, which he repeated several times, sometimes together with Gideon Rosen. I will 
start by a brief sketch of the account, which certainly will not do justice to its full complexity. 
Then I respond to the objection in two steps. Burgess and Rosen claim that the fate of 
hermeneutic fictionalism should be decided solely on the basis of empirical linguistic 
evidence. I argue first that the supportive evidence may come from philosophical 
considerations as well. Then I suggest, somewhat tentatively, that linguistic evidence alone 
might not even be sufficient for refutation. 
So let me start with Yablo. Quine has taught us that ontological commitment is marked by 
quantification. The entities whose existence we are committed to are the ones which we 
quantify over. Mathematics abounds with theorems which quantify over numbers, e.g. ‘Any 
two numbers have a product’. It seems then that the truth of mathematical theorems implies 
that numbers exist. Yablo claims that quantifying over numbers incurs no such commitment 
just as by asserting that ‘The average star has 2.4 planets’, we do not incur commitment to the 
existence of the average star. But how can we quantify over numbers and yet abstain from 
ontological commitment? 
Here is how. Number words have a use which is ontologically innocent, namely when they 
occur as devices of numerical quantification, like in ‘There are twelve apostles’. Here the 
number word can be resolved into the standard devices or first order predicate logic with 
identity.
6
 Starting from this innocent use we can get to quantification over numbers which is 
just as innocent by adopting a rule, which licenses the expression of the content of sentences 
involving numerical quantification in terms of quantification over numbers. Stated in a 
preliminary form, the rule says: if there are n Fs, imagine there is a thing n which is identical 
with the number of Fs. Using *S* as notation to be read ‘imagine/suppose that S’, the rule can 
be written as follows: 
(Npreliminary) if nx (Fx), then *there is a thing n (n = the number of Fs)*
7
 
F is a predicate applicable to ordinary objects, and in the antecedent, we have a simple 
numerical quantification that does not assume the existence of numbers as objects. In the 
consequent we have quantification over numbers, but the quantification is ontologically 
innocent, since it occurs in the scope of the ‘imagine that’ operator. When we merely imagine 
that something exists, we are not committed to its existence. What the rule says is not that 
whenever a specifiable real world condition obtains, there exists a given number; it says that 
whenever a certain real world condition obtains we are allowed to engage in a game of make-
belief and pretend that a given number exists. 
This rule, however, will not quite do, because it does not allow us to assign numbers to 
numbers, like when we say ‘The number of even primes equals 1’. ‘Even’ and ‘prime’ are 
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7
 The following account is based primarily on (Yablo 2002). 
3 
 
predicates applicable to numbers, not to ordinary objects, so they cannot occur in the 
antecedent of the rule. We need to liberalize the rule and allow such predicates in the 
antecedent. But if we deny that numbers exist, we must also deny that the properties even and 
prime are instantiated. However, if we may imagine that numbers exist, we may also imagine 
that these properties are instantiated. This gives us a clue as to how the rule should be 
amended: 
(N) if *nx (Fx)*, then *there is a thing n (n = the number of Fs)* 
This rule says that if you imagine that there are n Fs, where F may be a property of ordinary 
objects or numbers, you may also imagine that there is an object which is the number of Fs. 
This rule includes the preliminary one as a special case: if the antecedent of (Npreliminary) is 
satisfied, i.e. if there are indeed a certain number of ordinary objects which are F, you are 
certainly entitled to imagine that. 
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But why is it worth pretending that numbers exist? Because of the expressive power the 
quantificational idiom brings. Without this idiom, it would not be possible, for example, to 
formulate the laws of physics. Instead of Newton’s second law, we could only formulate a 
huge conjunction with conjuncts of the form ‘if a force F is exerted on a body with the mass 
M, it produces acceleration A’. But we would need an infinite number of conjuncts. Worse, 
since the magnitudes in question can take real numbers as values, the number of conjuncts 
should have to be uncountably infinite. If we are allowed to quantify over numbers, we can 
simply say, ‘For all real numbers F, M and A, if F = the force acting on a body with the mass 
= M, and A = the acceleration produced, then F = M × A’. 
It is exactly because of the expressive power of quantification over numbers that Quine 
believes that mathematical objects are indispensible for physics. Whereas Field accepts that 
the quantificational idiom yields ontological commitment, and tries to show that we can 
achieve the same expressive power without quantifying over numbers, Yablo maintains that 
we may quantify over numbers and yet avoid commitment. We simply pretend that there are 
mathematical entities. He points out that the use of fictions for purposes of representation is 
very common. For instance, you may describe a certain bodily feel of nervousness by saying 
‘There are butterflies in my stomach’. Of course, you do not believe that there are. But if there 
were, you think that would feel in this way. So you call us to imagine a fictitious state of 
affairs in order to describe a state of affairs which is real. Indeed, this is the way in which 
metaphors usually work. Metaphors, read literally, are typically false, but they call us to 
imagine something. If the call is accepted, the features of what is imagined point us to certain 
features of reality. One may describe the location of the city of Crotone saying ‘It is on the 
arch of the Italian boot’.9 Italy is not a boot, but if you are willing to pretend that it is, the 
sentence tells us where the city is to be found. It is because mathematics shares this feature of 
figurative speech that Yablo prefers to call his approach ‘figuralism’. 
We have seen that real contents of sentences of applied mathematics are states of affairs 
which include nothing mathematical. But what about pure mathematics? What is, for instance 
‘3 + 5 = 8’ about if not about numbers? Yablo shows how sentences of pure mathematics can 
be recast in the ontologically innocent idiom of numerical quantification. The basic idea is to 
use rule (N) backwards. What the previous sentence really says is something like this: ‘If 
there are exactly three Fs and there are exactly five Gs, and no F is a G, then there are exactly 
eight objects which are Fs or Gs’. This is a logical truth. Yablo goes on to show how to 
reconstruct all sentences of arithmetic, including the ones which quantify over numbers, as 
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objects. 0 is the number of things not identical to themselves, n is the number of numbers smaller than n. 
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logical truths, and he does the same for set theory. You can already see how Yablo can 
explain why mathematics is necessary and how it can be known a priori. 
This should suffice to give us a flavor of Yablo’s approach. Let us now see why Burgess 
and Rosen believe that an account along these lines is untenable. The objection is not directed 
specifically against fictionalism but against nominalism in general. The nominalist denies the 
existence of abstract objects, so he does not accept that the mathematical sentences apparently 
asserting the existence of such objects are literally true. At this point, he has two options. To 
admit that these sentences are true and deny that they are understood literally, or to admit that 
they are understood literally and deny that they are true. The former is the hermeneutic, the 
latter is the revolutionary position. Burgess and Rosen argue that both are untenable. The 
hermeneutic position fails because it is not supported by scientific evidence. The 
revolutionary position fails because there are no sound scientific reasons to challenge the truth 
of mathematics or to replace current mathematics with a nominalistic alternative such as 
Field’s or Chihara’s. I emphasize “scientific”, because Burgess and Rosen are of the 
conviction that purely philosophical considerations can never take precedence over scientific 
reasoning. For example, epistemological worries about how we can acquire knowledge of the 
abstract entities of mathematics are not sufficient to discredit mathematicians’ claims to 
knowledge, and a fortiori, the truths of mathematics.
10
 I grant this. 
Nonetheless—and now I am starting with the response—when it comes to arguing against 
the hermeneutic approach, the point that purely philosophical considerations cannot trump 
scientific ones is replaced by something stronger, namely that philosophical considerations 
are simply irrelevant and carry no weight at all. They write “no nominalists favoring such a 
reconstrual have ever published their suggestions in a linguistics journal with evidence such 
as a linguist without ulterior ontological motives might accept”.11 At another place Burgess 
briefly responds to those criticisms which allege that nominalists can have a third alternative 
in addition to hermeneutics and revolution. 
[I]t is sometimes said that a nominalist interpretation represents “the best way to make 
sense of” what mathematicians say. I see in this formulation not a third alternative, but 
simply an equivocation, between “the empirical hypothesis about what mathematicians 
mean that best agrees with the evidence” (hermeneutic) and “the construction that can be 
put on mathematicians’ words that would best reconcile them with certain philosophical 
principles or prejudices” (revolutionary).12 
What these remarks indicate is that the evidence for a nominalist interpretation of 
mathematics, such as Yablo’s, should be purely empirical and should not rely on 
philosophical considerations. This is actually how Burgess and Rosen proceed when they take 
up Yablo’s position. 13 They systematically ignore the philosophical benefits Yablo’s account 
may bring, and focus on the evidence from linguistic behavior. E.g. Yablo claims that the ease 
with which we pass from ontological innocent number talk to the quantificational formula, 
that we do not demand a proof existence, suggests that the latter idiom does not carry 
ontological commitment either. Or: if the Oracle mentioned in Burgess’ and Rosen’s book,14 
who knows exactly what exists, would proclaim that only concrete objects exist, 
mathematicians would not renounce their existence claims. I do not want to discuss Yablo’s 
linguistic arguments and Burgess’ and Rosen’s rejoinders. Suffice it to say that I do not find 
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the rejoinders convincing, and I will later argue that a knockdown linguistic counterargument 
might not be that easy to formulate. 
What I contend is that in assessing the case for hermeneutic fictionalism, it is wrong to 
disregard philosophical considerations.
15
 I do not base this on the intrinsic importance of 
philosophy but on two facts about interpretation. First fact: interpretation—be it the 
interpretation of a text, of the behavior of a person, of a set social practices—is aimed at 
making sense, i.e. showing how the various parts hang together, how they cohere. The pursuit 
of coherence is checked against the empirical facts. Here is an example. Before the elections, 
a politician promises not to raise taxes, he comes to power, then raises them. There are several 
ways this may make sense. One: he believed he would not have to raise taxes and later found, 
to his dismay, that he was mistaken. Two: he knew all too well that he could not avoid raising 
taxes and calculated that the loss of credibility would be acceptable price for the increase of 
popularity the false promise would bring. Three: something in between; he was not certain, 
but he hoped he would not have to and took a calculated risk. Which is right? Empirical 
evidence decides. We have to find out what information he had about the state of the 
economy, how well he understood the information he had, what his advisors said, how often 
he kept his earlier promises, etc. And there are also several ways the story does not make 
sense (or at least does not make sense without further assumptions). One: he believed he 
would not have to raise taxes, and indeed he did not have to, still he raised them just for the 
fun of it. Two: he made a sincere promise and intended to keep it, just did not realize the 
legislation he passed was about tax raises. So an interpretation can fail in two ways: by 
conflicting with the empirical evidence and by violating the demand for coherence. 
Second fact: judging whether or how much certain patterns are coherent draws heavily on 
the interpreter’s own beliefs. This element of subjectivity is ineliminable, because there is no 
universal manual for identifying coherent patterns. The closest we have to such a manual is 
logic, but in matters of interpretation, logic might not have the last word. An interpretation 
which involves the attribution of inconsistency, might, on the whole, be better than one which 
involves the attribution a very far-fetched idea which happens to restore consistency. And to 
tell whether an idea is indeed far-fetched one has to rely on his own beliefs. Let me illustrate 
the same fact with the earlier example. Suppose you are thinking black and white. Then you 
will think that our politician either made a sincere promise but was unlucky, or he lied, and 
there are no other options. If you do think that, then, of course, you are a lousy interpreter. A 
good understanding of the field, human psychology and politics in this case, is necessary for a 
good interpretation. So the element of subjectivity does not imply arbitrariness. 
How does this all bear on hermeneutic fictionalism? A philosopher, whose purpose is to 
interpret mathematics as a cognitive enterprise, wants to find out how various things in and 
around mathematics hang together. In deciding whether certain ideas cohere, he cannot but 
rely on what he believes. Suppose he believes that knowledge presupposes some kind of 
causal access. In that case, he would find it difficult to conceive how the Platonist account of 
mathematics, according to which mathematics provides literally true descriptions of abstract 
objects, which are not located in space-time and which are causally inert, may rationally 
cohere with the fact we do have mathematical knowledge. Or he may wonder how 
                                               
15 If I succeed, I shall have also disposed of Mark Balaguer’s objection. In Balaguer’s taxonomy there is no room 
for hermeneutic fictionalism. He defines fictionalism as the view that mathematical sentences should be taken at 
face value and are false. Yablo believes that mathematical sentences are true, so he is what Balaguer calls a 
paraphrase nominalist. Paraphrase nominalism is wrong because the empirical evidence suggests that 
mathematicians understand mathematical sentences literally and not according to the nominalist paraphrase. To 
me, this sounds like the same complaint as the one raised by Burgess and Rosen. (Balaguer 2008), (Balaguer 
2009, 152, 158). 
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mathematics, alleged to describe causally inert objects, can benefit physics, which provides 
causal explanations. 
If this is right, and the philosopher’s interpretation of mathematics is a genuine 
interpretative enterprise, it cannot make do without reliance on the philosopher’s own 
convictions. So Burgess and Rosen are wrong when they demand that the interpretation of 
mathematics is to be based purely on empirical evidence, and should be free of philosophical 
considerations. Interpretation is never based purely on empirical evidence. It is in the business 
of uncovering coherence, rational connections between parts—and whether the parts are 
indeed rationally connected, is not something that can be empirically determined. The 
objection rests on a misunderstanding of what interpretation involves. 
I want to emphasize that the above view of interpretation does not mean that philosophers 
are entitled to read into mathematics whatever philosophical views they happen to have. In 
order to see that, it is worth taking a look at how the empirical evidence and the interpreter’s 
convictions interact in the course of interpretation. Suppose a historian is writing a book on 
Kepler. The dates when Kepler’s books were published can be determined empirically. Once 
again, empirical evidence shows that the astronomical theory of Harmonice Mundi, which 
includes what we now call Kepler’s laws, is superior to the astronomical theory in his first 
book, Mysterium Cosmographicum. But it is not empirical evidence which says that it was 
extremely odd of Kepler to republish his first book two years after the publication Harmonice 
Mundi. This judgment draws on the historian’s own understanding that science aims primarily 
at empirically accurate theories. Given this understanding, the publication of an empirically 
inferior theory just does not make sense. The historian needs to find a coherent pattern which 
Kepler’s actions fit. He may, for example suggest, that Kepler does not share the current view 
that empirical accuracy has exclusive importance. Kepler was a Platonist and held that that the 
world should exhibit an impressive mathematical order. Now Mysterium Cosmographicum is 
superior to Harmonice Mundi in terms of mathematical order. (Its leading idea is that orbits 
are circular and their distances are regulated by the five platonic solids: a platonic solid 
circumscribed around the orbit a planet closer to the Sun is inscribed in the orbit of the planet 
farther from the Sun.) Now, the historian who proceeds like this does not simply impute his 
own beliefs to Kepler, since he admits that Kepler’s vision of science is different from his 
own. But he does not put his own beliefs aside either. After all, it is in terms of a belief he 
shares with Kepler that he makes sense of Kepler’s actions, namely that it is right to publish 
what one believes to be good science. It is in the light of this conviction that Kepler’s actions 
turn out in a way rational. So the way to conceive the role of the interpreter’s own convictions 
is this. The interpreter’s convictions provide ways in which what is interpreted can be 
construed as exhibiting coherence. The role of empirical evidence is to determine which ones 
of these coherent patterns are, in fact, exhibited. 
I have been arguing so far that Burgess and Rosen cannot rule that evidence from 
philosophical considerations is inadmissible. This may strengthen the case for hermeneutic 
fictionalism. Now I want to go further and suggest that it is not entirely clear that hermeneutic 
fictionalism can be refuted at all solely by non-philosophical considerations. Suppose we 
consider only arguments from the mathematicians’ linguistic behavior and in the 
interpretation of what mathematicians say and write we consciously abstain from relying on 
philosophical considerations. I will consider two scenarios in which the result of such non-
philosophical arguments is apparently unfavorable to hermeneutic fictionalism and claim that 
these scenarios do not suffice to refute hermeneutic fictionalism. 
The first scenario is that we find that mathematicians do not believe that mathematical 
objects are fictions because they do not have beliefs about their ontological status. For 
instance, an empirical survey shows that the overwhelming majority of mathematicians say 
7 
 
that they have not thought much about this question, they are not particularly interested in it, 
or claim to be ignorant about it, or are ready to adopt any position recommended to them; and 
the minority which displays interest consist of two groups. Members of the one have views 
which are vague, ambiguous, inconsistent or otherwise unsatisfactory. Members of the other 
minority group are very sophisticated but cannot agree among themselves. If this were the 
case, the hermeneutic fictionalist would have to choose carefully the way in which he 
formulates his position. In particular, he should make it very clear that he is not offering a 
psychological description of what mathematicians think. He should possibly avoid talking 
about mathematicians’ beliefs, or explain that what he calls beliefs are the views which make 
best sense of what mathematicians do rather than the dispositional mental states they have. Or 
he should prefer to talk about mathematics and mathematical practice rather than of 
mathematicians. 
This would not be an ad hoc maneuver. Interpretations often involve elements which are 
not meant to be psychologically faithful.
16
 As a first example, take some current 
interpretations of Descartes which allege that ideas are to be understood as intentional 
contents. Viewed as a psychological statement ,this would involve some distortion, because 
Descartes did not possess the concept of intentional content. Today’s concept of intentional 
content is informed by the tradition of Brentano, Husserl, Frege and Chisholm, which 
emerged only much later. Instead, advocates of this interpretation should be viewed as 
claiming that understanding Descartes’s concept as intentional content is consistent with what 
Descartes actually says, and sheds light on how various elements of Descartes’s thought hang 
together. For a more dramatic example, take the interpretation of potlatch as a means of 
maintaining hierarchical relations between clans or villages. Surely, when the Indians of the 
Pacific Northwest gather to give away and often destroy vast amount of goods, they do not 
think of this as a way of reinforcing their social status. It is not just that they do not possess 
the concepts of social science. Even if they did, the social scientists’ explanation, which is 
thoroughly secular, would not occur to them, because in their eyes, potlatch has a religious 
character. 
It is important to see that interpretations which fail in terms of psychological faithfulness 
may be fully legitimate as interpretations—they are not abnormal or deviant. Interpretation is 
in the business of making sense, displaying how things rationally cohere. Now sometimes we 
cannot capture coherence in terms of the actual beliefs of the people we interpret. Descartes’s 
concept of idea is not sufficiently clear to make the coherence of his thought transparent. The 
people practicing potlatch explain this custom in terms of following the law. But we believe 
that laws must serve some purpose, so we need a rationale, and the people do not provide one. 
If an interpreter finds that coherence cannot be captured by psychologically faithful 
descriptions, he forgoes psychological faithfulness. Similarly, if hermeneutic fictionalism 
succeeds in making sense of mathematics and its use in physics, it should not be faulted on 
grounds that it does not represents mathematicians’ beliefs. 
Let us move over to the second scenario. Here, the interpretation of the linguistic behavior 
of mathematicians—which relinquishes philosophical considerations—makes it clear that 
mathematicians reject fictionalism. Imagine, it turns out, they are all Platonists. 
Notice that this would not automatically refute fictionalism. It might be the case that the 
fictionalists are right, and the mathematicians are wrong. This is Mark Balaguer’s favored 
                                               
16 For the purposes of discussion, I assume two things. First, that facts about beliefs are as “hard” as any physical 
fact. Second, that people are not mistaken about their beliefs. Giving up either assumptions would give me more 
room to maneuver but would also invite several objections. 
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response to the Burgess-Rosen argument.
17
 He claims that revolutionary fictionalism, which 
accepts that mathematical statements are understood literally and are false is tenable. It would 
be admissible to overrule mathematicians’ judgments concerning the ontological status of 
mathematical entities, for two reasons. First, such a decision would be of little significance for 
mathematical practice. Second, mathematicians’ professional expertise, which a philosopher 
cannot question, does not extend to the issues of ontological status. 
However, hermeneutic fictionalism holds that mathematical statements are true, but are 
not understood literally, and it is hermeneutic fictionalism I wish to defend. There are two 
forms the defense can take. One is to reevaluate the mathematician’s alleged commitment to 
Platonism. Suppose mathematicians explain why they take mathematical sentences literally 
true in the following way. “Look, we know how to tell metaphors from literal speech. We 
speak literally when we use the words as we ordinarily do. Now the word ‘Sun’ normally 
refers to a hot ball of gas. When Romeo calls Juliet the Sun, he cannot be talking literally, 
since he cannot possibly believe that Juliet is a hot ball of gas. But as opposed to the word 
‘Sun’, mathematical terms do not have an established use with which our use could be 
contrasted. So we are talking literally.” In response to this, the hermeneutic fictionalist may 
point out that certain expressions are inherently metaphorical in the sense that they do not 
have literal uses. Take the word ‘Vulcan’ introduced in Star Trek. If you call someone who 
always behaves in a cool, emotionally detached and highly logical fashion a Vulcan, you do 
not mean that he comes from a humanoid race which evolved on the planet Vulcan, since you 
know all too well that he does not. Or if you describe someone prone to emotional and 
illogical behavior as not being a Vulcan, you do not mean to assert that he does not from that 
race. And even if you call Captain Spock a Vulcan, you do not mean in all seriousness that 
there is an individual bearing this name who comes from the planet Vulcan. This example is 
meant to illustrate that when mathematicians confess to Platonism, that may be due to the fact 
that they misconstrue ‘literal’ or construe it in a way that differs from the hermeneutic 
fictionalist’s intention.18 
But suppose no such maneuver is possible. Mathematicians happen to be very 
sophisticated in matters of linguistics, they do not misconstrue hermeneutic fictionalism, but 
they reject it in full knowledge of what it involves. That alone would still not be enough to 
refute hermeneutic fictionalism. When defending revolutionary fictionalism, Balaguer 
considers the idea that his revolutionism might not concern mathematics at all.
19
 He envisages 
a version of Platonism which runs as follows. Mathematical facts are compounded of two 
sorts of facts: ontologically neutral facts about the correctness of mathematical sentences 
construed in fictionalist terms, and platonic facts to the effect that the abstract objects 
mathematical sentences seem to describe exist, which make it the case that the sentences 
which are correct in the fictionalist terms are actually true. It is only these platonic facts which 
on the fictionalist view do not obtain. Balaguer wonders if the platonic facts are mathematical 
facts at all. If not, the fictionalism he proposes would amount to a revolution in philosophy 
rather than mathematics. He admits that he does not know how to show that the alleged 
platonic facts are not mathematical in nature, and neither do I. 
I believe, however, that the hermeneutic fictionalist can make a similar move and is in a 
position to argue for it. Suppose that if we take into account philosophical considerations and 
no others, fictionalism scores better than other alternatives. This should be granted for the 
sake of argument, since if fictionalism fails on philosophical grounds, it fails, and there is no 
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revolutionary distinction, 157-161. 
18 For a more inclusive discussion see (Yablo 2000, 221-224.) 
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 (Balaguer 2009, 156.) 
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point in trying to show that it can be maintained in the in face of its rejection by 
mathematicians. Then from the hermeneutic fictionalist’s point of view, the situation looks as 
follows. Certain things mathematicians say, e.g. ‘For every prime number there is a larger 
one’, are true, even though not in a literal sense. Other things they say, e.g. ‘Numbers are 
abstract objects and they do exist’ are false in the literal sense. (If mathematicians did not 
intend these sentences in the literal sense, they would not be contradicting the fictionalist.) 
For sentences in the first group, they have arguments, which are virtually impossible to resist, 
and these arguments apply a small group of very special methods, such as deduction from 
axioms. Arguments for the sentences in the second group are not based on these special 
methods, and they can and should be resisted. Add to these certain behavioral or, if you wish, 
sociological facts. The professional training mathematicians receive prepares them to deal 
with the first group. The scholarly journals they publish in are devoted to the first group. One 
may gain recognition as a great mathematician only by establishing claims in the first group. 
Those who are exclusively concerned with the second group are typically not regarded as 
mathematicians, and the list may be continued. All in all, we find that the distinction between 
the two groups of sentences is not a local phenomenon but is manifested in many ways. Given 
the significance this distinction seems to have, an interpretation of mathematical practice has 
to account for it. And the easiest way to account for it is to say that sentences in the first group 
are the only ones that  genuinely belong to mathematics. If this is right, then the 
mathematicians’ uniform commitment to Platonism envisaged in this second scenario does 
not provide much of an argument against hermeneutic fictionalism, because this commitment 
falls outside territory of mathematics. 
Let me summarize. I argued that Burgess and Rosen are wrong when they demand that 
hermeneutic fictionalism should be established purely by linguistic considerations. This 
argument was based on the nature of interpretation. I also raised doubts whether hermeneutic 
fictionalism can be defeated purely by linguistic considerations. I did that by considering two 
scenarios which might have seemed to support decisive linguistic objections. This latter 
argument was not meant to be conclusive. Perhaps one may develop a very well motivated 
account of fictional talk and use this to show that hermeneutic fictionalism is untenable. 
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